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China's Anti-Monopoly Law:
Insights from U.S. and EU Precedents on
Abuse of Dominance and IP Exemption
Provisions
By YIN ZHOU*
I. Introduction
Since opening to the global market in 1978, China has enjoyed
consistent and rapid economic growth. Such liberalization and
economic growth created a need for regulations to maintain a
smoothly functioning market. By the mid-1990s, the need for a set
of antitrust laws became apparent in light of the rise in domestic
consumerism and investments from large foreign corporations.'
After thirteen years of drafting and revisions, China passed its Anti-
Monopoly Law ("AML") on August 30, 2007.2 This was the first
time that China passed such a comprehensive set of antitrust laws, 3
sparking an unprecedented level of interest in how the AML will
affect China's rapid economic growth.4
* J.D. candidate, May 2009, University of California, Hastings College of the
Law. The author would like to thank Professor James McCall for his guidance and
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1. Jared A. Berry, Anti-Monopoly Law in China: A Socialist Market Economy
Wrestles with Its Antitrust Regime, 2 BYU INT'L L. & MGMT. REV. 129, 136 (2005),
available at http://www.byuilmr.org/media/articles/berry-antimonopolyin
China.pdf.
2. China's New Anti-monopoly Law: Caveat Investor, AsIALAW, October 2007
(hereinafter "Caveat Investor").
3. See Eleanor M. Fox, An Anti-Monopoly Law for China - Scaling the Walls of
Protectionist Government Restraints 1 (N.Y.U. Sch. of Law Pub. Law & Legal Theory
Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 07-13, 2007), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract=1003162 and Berry, supra note 1, at 129.
4. H. Stephen Harris, Jr., The Making of an Antitrust Law: The Pending Anti-
Monopoly Law of the People's Republic of China, 7 CHI. J. INT'L L. 169, 169 (2006).
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The AML came into effect on August 1, 2008,5 but many
companies started seeking legal advice much earlier to determine
whether they would comply with the law as written.6 However,
ambiguities within the language of the law limited the ability of
companies and their legal counsel to predict compliance. 7 This
paper focuses on the AML provisions dealing with abuse of
dominant position and intellectual property ("IP") rights, and seeks
to provide insight into how they may be applied.
Where China draws the distinction between abusive conduct
and beneficial competition depends, in part, on its antitrust goals.
However, "[tihe treatment of unilateral conduct by firms with
dominant market positions is the most challenging and difficult area
of antitrust policy because it is often very difficult to distinguish
between beneficial, aggressive competition and harmful,
exclusionary conduct." 8 This difficulty is compounded because
under Article 1 of the AML, China's antitrust goals appear to be
competing.9 One view is that the AML should promote consumer
5. Caveat Investor, supra note 2.
6. See, e.g., Lester Ross, John Ratliff, and Gil Ohana, WilmerHale Email Alert,
China Enacts National Competition Law (September 5, 2007),
http://www.wilmerhale.com/publications/whPubsDetail.aspx?publication=7975;
Clifford Chance Client Briefing, Chinese Antitrust: Let the Games Begin (August
2007), http://www.cliffordchance.com/expertise/publications/details.aspx?Filter
Name =@UR L&LangID=UK&contentitemid=12590.
7. See Peter Wang, China: New Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law, MONDAQ BUSINESS
BRIEFING, Oct. 16, 2007 (For example, "the second paragraph of Article 7 prohibits
[State-Owned Enterprises] from abusing their dominant positions or legal
monopolies to the detriment of consumers. It remains to be seen whether this
article is used by the Anti-monopoly Enforcement Authorities ... to protect SOEs
or rein them in." Moreover, Article 17 of the AML prohibits dominant
undertakings from selling at "unfairly" high prices or buying at "unfairly" low
prices, but it does not define what is "unfair.").
8. See, e.g., Gerald F. Masoudi, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust
Division, U.S. Department of Justice, Some Comments on the Abuse-of-Dominance
Provisions of China's Draft Antimonopoly Law, Remarks at the UIBE Competition
Law Center Conference on Abuse of Dominance: Theory and Practice, Beijing,
China (July 21, 2007), http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/225357.htm; see
also United States v. Microsoft, 253 F.3d 34, 58 (D.C. Cir. 2001) [hereinafter
Microsoft III] ("Whether any particular act of a monopolist is exclusionary, rather
than merely a form of vigorous competition, can be difficult to discern: the means
of illicit exclusion, like the means of legitimate competition, are myriad. The
challenge for an antitrust court lies in stating a general rule for distinguishing
between exclusionary acts, which reduce social welfare, and competitive acts,
which increase it.").
9. See Fan Long Duan Fa [Anti-Monopoly Law] (promulgated by the Standing
Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Aug. 30, 2007, effective Aug. 1, 2008), art. 1, translated
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welfare and efficiency. 10 Others see the AML as a means of
protecting small and medium enterprises from larger competitors."
Yet another perspective states that the AML should shield domestic
enterprises from foreign rivals.12 Support for each perspective can
be found in the antitrust and industrial policies of various foreign
jurisdictions, but the relative future influence of those approaches is
left unresolved by the final text of the AML.'3
The text of the abuse provisions also leaves ample room for
debate as to their application. For example, most of the abuses in
Article 17 are qualified with "without any justification," but there is
little guidance on what kind of affirmative defense or justification
would be sufficient. Moreover, Article 19 allows the possibility that
a firm with eleven percent market share could be presumed to have
a jointly dominant position, but it is unclear how the presumption of
joint dominance could be established. 4
With respect to the IP provisions under Article 55, foreign
investors are concerned that normal business practices intended to
protect IP rights may be found unlawful or that dominant
undertakings may be systematically forced to license their IP to
competitors. 15 Although on its face the AML avoids frustrating the
by Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton (on file with author) (P.R.C.) [hereinafter
AML] (providing that the law "will be enacted for the purpose of guarding against
or ceasing monopolistic conduct, safeguarding and promoting the order of market
competition, improving economic efficiency, protecting the consumer's interest,
protecting the public interest, and promoting the healthy development of the
socialist market economy"); see also Nathan Bush, The PRC Antimonopoly Law:
Unanswered Questions and Challenges Ahead, THE ANTITRUST SOURCE, Oct. 2007, at 2,
http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/at-source/07/10/Oct7-BushlO-18f.pdf
("Whether Chinese competition policy makers embrace prevailing international
practices depends, understandably, on whether such foreign practices will achieve
their policy goals. Problematically, China's antitrust priorities remain unsettled...
Article 1 reflects real disagreement within the Chinese government and academic
establishment as to the proper role of the AML.").
10. Bush, supra note 8, at 2.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. AML, art. 19.
15. Caveat Investor, supra note 2 ("[Tlhe AML does not contain any indication
as to what would be considered an "abuse" of IP rights. This means that some types
of conduct that are considered normal business practice for the protection of IP
rights may become illegal under the AML. Some have even suggested that this
provision may potentially serve to create systems of compulsory licensing between
competitors in a market.").
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valid exercise of IP rights, it provides no guidance on how Chinese
courts will distinguish legitimate uses of IP rights from abuses,
which may give rise to antitrust claims.
Because of the uncertainties in the AML's application, an
analysis of comparable United States and European Union ("EU")
antitrust provisions is helpful in understanding how Chinese courts
will construe the AML. Specifically, this note examines how
Chinese courts will analyze IP defenses against antitrust claims and
how they will define the crucial terms of "dominant position," "joint
dominance," "abusive conduct," and "legal justification."
Part II of this note provides an overview of the AML. Part III
examines how the United States and the European Union have dealt
with abuse of dominant position and the interface between IP rights
and antitrust policies. Part IV addresses potential lessons from U.S.
and EU precedents and applies them to the litigation between
TSUM and Sony. Lastly, Part V provides concluding remarks.
II. Overview of the AML
The AML has eight chapters. The first offers general
provisions, including the purpose of the law, the definition of
monopolistic conduct, and functions of the Anti-Monopoly
Committee and the Anti-Monopoly Enforcement Authority.1 6
Chapter two defines prohibited and acceptable monopoly
agreements. Under Articles 13 and 14 of the AML, prohibited
monopoly agreements include those fixing or changing prices;
restricting production or shipment; dividing sales or procurement
markets; restricting the purchase of new technology or new
facilities; restricting the development of new technology or new
products; engaging in joint boycotts; and restricting the minimum
prices for resale.17 These prohibitions do not apply, however, if the
undertakings can prove that the monopoly agreements are for
purposes such as developing new products, upgrading product
quality, reducing costs, improving efficiency, enhancing
competition, maintaining public welfare, and protecting the
legitimate interests of international trade and cooperation.' 8
Chapter three sets forth the criteria based on which a dominant
16. See generally AML, ch. 1.
17. AML, arts. 13, 14.
18. AML, art. 15.
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market position is determined and outlines behaviors that are
considered an abuse of dominant market position. An undertaking
has a dominant position if it can control price, quantity, or other
transaction conditions, or can block or affect another undertakings'
access to the relevant market. 19 Article 18 mandates that all relevant
factors are considered in determining whether an undertaking has a
dominant market position, including the undertaking's market
share in the relevant market, its ability to control the sales or
procurement market, and barriers to entry.20 However, under
Article 19, a dominant market position is presumed if the
undertaking accounts for half of the market share by itself, jointly
accounts for two-thirds of the market share with one other
undertaking, or jointly accounts for three-quarters of the market
share with two other undertakings. 21 Joint dominance does not
apply if the undertaking has a market share of less than 10 percent. 22
Article 17 of the AML defines abuse of dominant market
position. This provision was modeled after Article 82 of the Treaty
establishing the European Economic Community ("EC Treaty"). 23
Under both the AML and the EC Treaty, abuse includes selling at
unfairly high prices or buying at unfairly low prices, selling below
cost without justification, refusing to deal with trading partners
without justification, exclusive dealings, tying, and applying
discriminatory terms to similarly situated trading partners without
justification.24
Chapters four through seven are not the focus of this paper; the
notes here are sufficient to provide a brief overview. Chapter four
discusses "concentrations" and the procedure for conducting them.
Concentration refers to mergers, acquisitions, and obtaining control
by contract or other means.25 Chapter five prohibits the abuse of
administrative powers to restrict competition. Chapter six and
seven focus on investigation of suspicious monopolistic behavior
and legal liabilities.
19. AML, art. 17.
20. AML, art. 18.
21. AML, art. 19.
22. AML, art. 19.
23. Treaty Establishing the European Community art. 82, Nov. 10, 1997, 1997
O.J. (C 340) 3 (hereinafter "EC Treaty").
24. AML, art. 17.
25. AML, art. 20.
20091
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Finally, chapter eight includes supplementary provisions. The
only supplementary provision that concerns this paper is Article 55,
which states that the AML is not applicable to conduct by
undertakings to protect legitimate intellectual property rights.
Specifically, Article 55 provides that "[t]his Law is not applicable to
conducts by undertakings to protect their legitimate intellectual
property rights...; however, this Law is applicable to the conduct
of undertakings to eliminate or restrict market competition by
abusing intellectual property rights."26
III. Comparing U.S. and EU Approaches
Both the U.S. and the EU have had substantial experience in
regulating monopolies. The following discussion attempts to
highlight some of the key similarities and differences between their
approaches.
The phrase "monopolization conduct" is used in the U.S. to
describe the concept of abuse of dominant position. Monopolization
conduct is prohibited in the U.S. under Section 2 of the Sherman
Act.27 Monopolization has two elements: "(1) the possession of
monopoly power in the relevant market and (2) the willful
acquisition or maintenance of that power as distinguished from
growth or development as a consequence of a superior product,
business acumen, or historic accident." 28 In the EU, an abuse of
dominant position is prohibited under Article 82 of the EC Treaty.
Like monopolization conduct, an abuse of dominant position also
has two elements: (1) the possession of a dominant position, and (2)
an abuse of that position "in so far as it may affect trade between
Member States." 29
A. Monopoly Power v. Dominant Position
Monopoly power under section 2 of the Sherman Act has been
interpreted as "the power to control prices or exclude
competition."30 In order to determine if a firm possesses monopoly
power, the Department of Justice ("DOJ") must first define the
26. AML, art. 55.
27. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2008); EC Treaty, art. 82.
28. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966).
29. EC Treaty, art. 82.
30. A.B.A. Section of Antitrust Law, Antitrust Law Developments 225 (6th ed.
2007).
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relevant market, which consists of both a product market and a
geographic market.31
The relevant product market consists of all products
"reasonably interchangeable by consumers for the same
purposes." 32 Under the 1992 DOJ Horizontal Merger Guidelines, the
DOJ begins its product market definition by asking: "what would
happen if a hypothetical monopolist of that product imposed a
'small but significant and nontransitory' increase in price, but the
terms of sale of all other products remained constant?" 33 If sales
would decrease to the extent that a hypothetical monopolist would
not find it profitable to impose the price increase, then the DOJ
would include the next-best substitute in the product market. 34
Next, the DOJ asks the price increase question "for a hypothetical
monopolist controlling the expanded product group... until a
group of products is identified such that a hypothetical monopolist
over that group of products would profitably impose at least a
'small but significant and nontransitory' increase." 35 The same
"small but significant and nontransitory" price increase analysis is
used to determine the relevant geographic market, defined as "the
[geographic] area to which customers can reasonably turn for
sources of supply."36
The next step in determining monopoly power is to identify all
market players in the relevant market. Market players include all
current producers and sellers as well as those undertakings with the
ability to become a producer within one year, without significant
sunk costs of entry and exit, in response to a "small but significant
and nontransitory" price increase.37
Market share is then calculated for all identified market players
"based on current sales or capacity currently devoted to the relevant
market together with that which likely would be devoted to the
relevant market in response to a 'small but significant and
31. Id. at 228.
32. United States v. E. I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 395 (1956).
33. Horizontal Merger Guidelines, U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal
Trade Commission, 1.0-1.1 (Apr. 2, 1992) [hereinafter DOJ Merger Guidelines],
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/horiz-book/hmgl.html.
34. Id. 1.1.
35. Id. 1.11.
36. A.B.A. Section of Antitrust Law, Antitrust Law Developments 229 (6th ed.
2007).
37. DOJ Merger Guidelines, supra note 33, 1.32.
2009]
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nontransitory' price increase." 38
Many courts in the U.S. regard an alleged monopolist's market
share as the starting point in assessing whether it possesses
monopoly power.39 A firm with less than 50 percent market share is
almost never presumed to hold monopoly power.40 The Supreme
Court has held that monopoly power could be inferred from an 80
percent market share,41 a much higher threshold than the
presumption of dominance under Article 19 of China's AML. Other
factors, such as barriers to entry, 42  market structure and
performance,43  regulatory control,44  and monopoly in an
aftermarket,4 may also be determinative in reinforcing or rebutting
the monopoly power presumption.
In the EU, an undertaking is in a dominant position if it could
(1) prevent effective competition from being maintained, and (2)
behave to an appreciable extent independently of its competitors,
customers, and consumers.46 In assessing an undertaking's position
38. Id. 1.41
39. A.B.A. Section of Antitrust Law, Antitrust Law Developments 230 (6th ed.
2007).
40. Id. at 231-32.
41. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., 504 U.S. 451 (1992).
42. See, e.g., Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 591
n15 (1986); Microsoft III, 253 F.3d at 51 (Entry barriers "are factors.., that prevent
new rivals from timely responding to an increase in price above the competitive
level.").
43. See, e.g., United States v. Dentsply Int'l, 399 F.3d 181, 187 (3d Cir. 2005)
(relevant factors include size and strength of competing firms, consumer demand
and pricing trends, and industry practices); Crossroads Cogeneration Corp. v.
Orange & Rockland Util., 159 F.3d 129, 141 (3d Cir. 1998) (courts must look at "the
strength of competition, probable development of the industry, the barriers to
entry, the nature of the anticompetitive conduct, and the elasticity of consumer
demand.").
44. See, e.g., Southern Pac. Commc'n Co. v. AT&T Co., 740 F.2d 980, 1000-02
(D.C. Cir. 1984) ("Reliance on statistical market share is a questionable approach in
cases involving regulated industries. . . [11n such cases market share should be at
most a point of departure in determining whether monopoly power exists."); MCI
Commc'n Co. v. AT&T Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1107 (7th Cir. 1983) (close scrutiny of
regulatory scheme required because "heavy reliance on market share statistics is
likely to be an inaccurate or misleading indicator of 'monopoly power' in a
regulated setting.").
45. See, e.g., Kodak, 504 U.S. at 455 ("The principal issue here is whether a
defendant's lack of market power in the primary equipment market precludes - as
a matter of law - the possibility of market power in derivative aftermarkets." The
aftermarket was Kodak's service of its own copiers.).
46. Case 322/81, Michelin v. Comrn'n, 1983 E.C.R. 3461 30.
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in relation to its competitors, customers, and consumers, the
Commission will consider the undertaking's market share in the
relevant market. 47
For the most part, the U.S. and the EU use a similar multi-step
analysis in defining the relevant market. The 1997 EC Notice on
Market Definition defines a relevant product market as "all those
products and/or services which are regarded as interchangeable or
substitutable by the consumer, by reason of the products'
characteristics, their prices and their intended use."48 In assessing
demand substitution, the Commission will ask "whether the parties'
customers would switch to readily available substitutes or to
suppliers located elsewhere in response to a hypothetical small (in
the range five percent to ten percent) but permanent relative price
increase in the products and areas." 49  In assessing supply
substitution, the Commission will ask whether "suppliers are able to
switch production to the relevant products and market them in the
short term without incurring significant additional costs or risks in
response to small and permanent changes in relative prices."5 0 The
relevant product market will consist of "all products that are
substitutable in demand and supply, and the current sales of those
products will be aggregated so as to give the total value or volume
of the market."5' The same hypothetical price increase analysis is
used in defining the relevant geographic market.5 2
Unlike the U.S., however, the EU uses a different standard for
the presumption of dominance. The Commission may presume
dominance when an undertaking's market share is greater than 50
percent,5 3 which is much lower than the 80 percent threshold found
in the U.S.54
47. See Michelin v. Comm'n, 1983 E.C.R. 3461 9 31-45; Commission Notice on
the Definition of Relevant Market for the Purposes of European Community
Competition Law, 1997 O.J. (C 372) 5, 9 [hereinafter 1997 EC Notice].
48. 1997 EC Notice 7.
49. Id. 13.
50. Id. 14.
51. Id. 15.
52. Id.
53. See Case T-228/97 Irish Sugar v. Comm'n, 1999 E.C.R. H1-2969 70.
54. See A.B.A. Section of Antitrust Law, Antitrust Law Developments 230 (6th
ed. 2007).
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B. Monopolization Conduct v. Abuse of Dominant Position
In the U.S., merely possessing monopoly power does not violate
section 2 of the Sherman Act.55 There must also be "the willful
acquisition or maintenance of that power as distinguished from
growth or development as a consequence of a superior product,
business acumen, or historic accident."56 Strategic conduct aimed at
incurring long-term benefits while sustaining short-term deficits
may be found to be monopolization conduct, even if the strategic
conduct is not otherwise unlawful.5 7 Types of monopolization
conduct include (1) attaining a monopoly through a horizontal
merger,5 8 (2) maintaining a monopoly through long-term exclusive
supply contracts that foreclose competitors from access to inputs,59
(3) engaging in exclusive dealing contracts,60 (4) selling below cost to
drive competitors out of business, 61 (5) litigating frivolously for the
purpose of impeding competitors' business activities, 62 and (6)
engaging in long-term customer contracts intended to reduce
demand for competitors' supply. 63
Compared to the U.S. concept of monopolization conduct,
abusive conduct under Article 82 of the EC Treaty is broader.
Specifically, conduct constituting an abuse in the EU includes
imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or other unfair trading
conditions; ... limiting production, markets or technical
development to the prejudice of consumers; ... applying
dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading
parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage;...
55. Id. at 240.
56. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. at 570-71.
57. See Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 610-11
(1985) (Aspen Skiing Company's refusal to cooperate with its smaller rival in a
marketing arrangement found to be monopolization conduct. The Supreme Court
found that the evidence supported an inference that Aspen Skiing Company "was
not motivated by efficiency concerns and that it was willing to sacrifice short-run
benefits and consumer goodwill in exchange for a perceived long-run impact on its
smaller rival.").
58. See generally Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
59. See generally United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d
Cir. 1945).
60. See generally Microsoft III, 253 F.3d at 72-74.
61. See generally Standard Oil Co., 221 U.S. 1.
62. See generally Otter Tail Power v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973).
63. See generally United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295
(D. Mass. 1953).
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making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the
other parties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature
or according to commercial usage, have no connection with the
subject of such contracts. 64
Moreover, the U.S. has prophylactic policies of not regulating
conduct which the U.S. regards as generally good for competition,
consumers, and innovation. 65 The EU, on the other hand, has not
adopted such rules.66 As a result, certain conduct that is legal in the
U.S. may be an abuse in the EU 67 For example, monopoly pricing
per se is not regulated in the U.S., but it could be considered unfair
and an abuse in the EU, regardless of its anticompetitive intent or
effects.68
C. Burden of Proof
Under the U.S. approach, the burden of proving
monopolization conduct lies with the plaintiff, who must
demonstrate that the monopolist's conduct harmed not just a
competitor, but competition.69 Once the plaintiff has demonstrated
anticompetitive effect, the monopolist bears the burden of proffering
a "procompetitive justification" for its conduct.70 A procompetitive
justification is a "nonpretextual claim that [the] conduct is indeed a
form of competition on the merits." Examples of pro-competitive
justification include greater efficiency and enhanced consumer
appeal. 71 If the monopolist proffers a procompetitive justification,
the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to either rebut that claim or to
demonstrate that the anticompetitive harm outweighs the
procompetitive benefit. 72
By contrast, in the EU, the heavier burden lies with the alleged
64. E.C. Treaty, art. 82.
65. Eleanor M. Fox, Monopolization, Abuse of Dominance, and the Indeterminacy of
Economics: The U.S./EU Divide, 3 UTAH L. REV. 725, 729-30 (2006).
66. Id. at 729.
67. Michal S. Gal, Monopoly Pricing as an Antitrust Offense in the U.S. and the EC:
Two Systems of Belief about Monopoly? 4 (N.Y.U. Law and Economics Research Paper
Series, Working Paper No. 04-01, 2004), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=700863.
68. Id. at 3, 20.
69. See Microsoft III, 253 F.3d at 58-59.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
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monopolist to demonstrate that its conduct does not violate Article
82. Although the Commission bears the initial burden of proving
the existence of the circumstances that constitute an infringement of
Article 82, the dominant undertaking bears a heavy burden of
reversing such a finding. The dominant undertaking must raise a
plea of objective justification and support it with arguments and
evidence before the end of the administrative procedure. 73  If
objective justification is shown, the burden then shifts to the
Commission to rebut the dominant undertaking's arguments and
evidence.74
D. Interface between Intellectual Property Rights and Antitrust
Laws in the U.S. and EU
Generally speaking, intellectual property rights give their
owners exclusivity over the use of the IP while antitrust policies are
meant to keep markets open.75 Although these two areas of law are
not always contradictory, tensions may arise when IP exclusivity
translates into market power.76
In the U.S., although prohibition of monopolization conduct
does not apply to the valid exercise of patent rights,77 a misuse of
patent rights may constitute an antitrust violation.78 The Federal
Circuit's standard for patent misuse is "whether, by imposing
conditions that derive their force from the patent, the patentee has
impermissibly broadened the scope of the patent grant with
anticompetitive effect." 79 Misuse has been found in situations where
a patent holder compelled a licensee of its patent process to
purchase unpatented goods to use in the process, 80 compelled a
licensee of one patent to take unwanted licenses under other
patents, 81 or compelled royalty payments regardless of the licensee's
73. Case T-201/04, Microsoft Corp. v. Comm'n, 2007 E.C.R. 11-3601 1144.
74. Id.
75. Richard Whish, Competition Law 676 (4th ed. 2001).
76. See id.
77. A.B.A. Section of Antitrust Law, Antitrust Law Developments 1083-84 (6th
ed. 2007).
78. See id. at 1140-45.
79. C.R. Bard Inc. v. M3 Sys., 157 F.3d 1340, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
80. See, e.g., B.B. Chem. Co. v. Ellis, 314 U.S. 495 (1942).
81. See, e.g., Hazeltine Research v. Zenith Radio Corp., 388 F.2d 25 (7th Cir.
1967), affd in part & rev'd in part, 395 U.S. 100 (1969); American Securit Co. v.
Shatterproof Glass Corp., 268 F.2d 769 (3d Cir. 1959).
[Vol. 32:2
China's Anti-Monopoly Law
use of the patent.8 2
Like the U.S., the EU adopts the view that an improper exercise
of intellectual property rights may amount to an antitrust
violation.8 3 For example, the Court of First Instance ("CFI") has held
that while, in general, a refusal by a dominant undertaking to
license a third party to use a product covered by an IP right will not
in itself constitute an abuse of dominant position, there are
exceptional circumstances where the exercise of such an exclusive
right by the owner of the IP may give rise to abuse.8 4 Such
exceptional circumstances have been found where (1) "the refusal
relates to a product or service indispensable to the exercise of a
particular activity on a neighboring market;" (2) "the refusal is of
such a kind as to exclude any effective competition on that
neighboring market;" and (3) "the refusal prevents the appearance
of a new product for which there is potential consumer demand."85
IV. Applying U.S. and EU Precedents to TSUM v. Sony
Sichuan Dexian Technology Co., also known as TSUM, is a
leading Chinese battery manufacturer.86 It sued Sony in Shanghai's
No. 1 Intermediate People's Court in November 2004 under the
existing Anti-Unfair Competition Law, accusing Sony of engaging in
unfair competition by designing their digital cameras to shut down
when lithium batteries made by other companies are installed.87
Although the AML did not apply as this case was filed years before
the law went into effect, the following analysis may nevertheless be
helpful in understanding the application of the AML provisions on
82. See, e.g., Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, 395 U.S. 100, 133-40
(1969).
83. Whish, supra note 75, at 698.
84. Case T-201/04, Microsoft Corp., 2007 E.C.R. 331-32.
85. Id. 332.
86. Michael Sohn et al., Innovation and Monopolization: Will the New Chinese
Antimonopoly Law Follow U.S. and EU Precedents?, 93 ANTrTRUST & TRADE
REGULATION REPORT 574, 574 (Nov. 2, 2007); Roger Parloff, Sony's China Problem:
Will a Lawsuit Against Sony in China Set a Scary Precedent?, Fortune, March 5, 2007,
available at http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune-archive/2007/
03/05/8401275 /index.htm.
87. Parloff, supra note 86; Jesse Markham, China Court Hears Antitrust Suit
Against Sony, MONDAQ BusINEss BRIEFING, January 26, 2007; and Sony v. Tsum
(Sichuan) Technology Co., Ltd., CHINA DAILY, January 18, 2007, available at
http://english.ipr.gov.cn/ipr/en/info/Article.jspano=47991&col_no=126&dir=20
0701.
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abuse of dominant position and IP exemption. 88
TSUM alleged that Sony uses a digital key in its battery system
to automatically reject competitors' batteries.89  In addition to
seeking to recover RMB 1 million spent on deciphering the digital
key technology, TSUM also sought to enjoin Sony from using the
digital key in its batteries. 90
Sony responded that its digital key offers safety and
technological advantages. Sony asserted that the use of the digital
key is a response to reports of smoke, explosion, and burning
caused by the use of non-Sony batteries in Sony's digital cameras
and camcorders.91 Moreover, Sony claimed that the key uses a
patented InfoLithium technology that relates signals between a
camera and its battery so that consumers can see the consumption of
battery power and the time remaining for use.92 Furthermore, Sony
asserted that its IP right allows it to use the patented technology
without the fear of antitrust liabilities. 93
A. Whether Sony Has a Dominant Market Position
Sony's dominant position could either be determined by
consideration of the various factors listed in Article 18 or be
presumed under Article 19 of the AML. In either case, the relevant
market must be defined. If the relevant market is defined as digital
cameras sold in China, it is unlikely that Sony would be found
dominant under Article 18 of the AML, regardless of whether the
analysis follows the U.S. or the EU approach. According to one
market research study, Canon is the market leader in China's digital
camera market, with approximately 27 percent market share, while
Sony and Samsung trail behind with market shares of 21 percent
88. The Shanghai court decided the case in favor of Sony in February 2008,
holding that the Anti-Unfair Competition Law was an improper basis for the suit.
The court, however, left the door open for TSUM to re-file the suit once the AML
becomes effective. Theodore M. Kneller, China's Anti-Monopoly Law: Addressing
Intellectual Property Abuses (June 6, 2008) (unpublished L.L.M. thesis, Tsinghua
University Law School) (on file with Tsinghua University Law School Library).
89. Sohn, supra note 86, at 574.
90. Id.
91. Sohn, supra note 86, at 574.
92. Sohn, supra note 86, at 577; What is an "InfoLithium" Battery, available at
http://www.high-techproductions.com/battery.htm; Sony v. Tsum (Sichuan)
Technology Co., Ltd., available at http://english.ipr.gov.cn/ipr/en/info/Article.jsp?
a_no=47991&col_no=126&dir=200701.
93. Sohn, supra note 86, at 574.
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and 13 percent, respectively. 94 Moreover, Canon is capturing the
market at a faster pace than Sony, widening their market share gap
in 2006 and 2007.95 Under these circumstances, it is unlikely that
Sony's position would have allowed it to control prices, exclude
competition, or behave to an appreciable extent independently of its
competitors.
It is less clear whether Sony would be found to occupy the
dominant position in China's digital video-camera market, where
Sony is the market leader with 43 percent market share.96 Its nearest
rivals are Panasonic and Samsung, with 19-percent and 13-percent
markets shares, respectively. 97 Under the U.S. approach, TSUM
probably would not meet its burden of showing that Sony possesses
monopoly power since U.S. courts virtually never find monopoly
power when market share is less than 50 percent.98 On the other
hand, the Commission might find Sony dominant under the EU
approach, which presumes dominance at 50 percent market share
and takes the view that a dominant position can generally be found
when a firm has 40 percent to 45 percent market share.99 The
Commission would also consider Sony's share relative to its
competitors: the smaller the shares of the competitors, the more
likely that the Commission would find Sony a dominant player.1 00
Here, Sony's market share is higher than the combined market
shares of its two nearest rivals, making it more likely for the
Commission to conclude that Sony holds a dominant position.
If the relevant market is indeed the digital video-camera
market, Article 19 of the AML may also come into play. Article 19
presumes dominance even if the dominant undertaking's market
share is as low as 11 percent, as long as its combined market share
94. CCID Consulting Reviews China's Digital Image Market in the First Half of
2007, August 2007, available at http://www.prnewswire.com/cgi-bin/stories.
pl?ACCT=ind focus.story&STORY=/www/story/10-03-2007/0004675028
&EDATE =WED+Oct+03+2007,+08:00+AM(follow "http://www. ccidconsulting.
corn/ upload/ 12114.jpg" hyperlink).
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. See A.B.A. Section of Antitrust Law, Antitrust Law Developments 230 (6th
ed. 2007).
99. See Case T-228/97 Irish Sugar v. Comm'n, 1999 E.C.R. 11-2969 70 and
Whish, supra note 75, at 155.
100. Whish, supra note 75, at 155; see also Case 322/81 Michelin v. Comm'n, 1983
E.C.R. 3461 (Michelin's main competitors held only four to eight market share.).
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with another undertaking accounts for two-thirds of the relevant
market, or its combined market share with two other undertakings
accounts for three-quarters of the relevant market.101 Here, Sony,
Panasonic and Samsung hold 75-percent market share in the digital
video-cameras market in China'0 2 and could therefore be presumed
collectively dominant. The AML does not require a showing of
concerted actions for the presumption of joint dominance to apply.
It is therefore possible that Sony could be presumed jointly
dominant with Panasonic and Samsung despite an absence of any
concerted efforts to monopolize China's digital video-camera
market. This represents a significant departure from both the U.S.
and the EU approaches. U.S. antitrust laws do not target unilateral
actions by undertakings individually holding less than 50-percent
market share, even when the combined market shares of such
undertakings would exceed 80 percent.103 Similarly, some concerted
actions among the undertakings are generally required before the
EU applies its joint dominance provisions. 04
B. Whether Sony Has Abused Its Dominant Position
Assuming Sony is found to hold a dominant position in China's
digital video-camera market, the question then becomes whether
Sony has abused that position by tying the sale of its digital video
cameras and batteries. 105
1. The U.S. Approach
To challenge Sony's conduct as a per se tying arrangement
under section 1 of the Sherman Act, TSUM would need to show that
"(1) the tying and tied goods are two separate products; (2) the
defendant has market power in the tying product market; (3) the
defendant affords consumers no choice but to purchase the tied
product from it; and (4) the tying arrangement forecloses a
substantial volume of commerce." 106 If TSUM could not satisfy all
101. AML, art. 19.
102. CCID Consulting Reviews, supra note 94.
103. See generally Spectrum Sports v. McQuillian, 506 U.S. 447 (1993).
104. Compagnie Maritime Belge Transports SA and Others v. Comm'n, 2000
E.C.R. 1-1365 36 [hereinafter CMB]; see also Masoudi, supra note 8.
105. Article 17 of the AML prohibits dominant undertakings from implementing
tie-in sales without any justification.
106. Microsoft III, 253 F.3d at 85 (citing Kodak, 504 U.S. at 461-62 (1992)).
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four elements, it might show that Sony's conduct is nevertheless
prohibited under the rule of reason, which "calls for a fuller 'inquiry
into the actual effect of the exclusive contract on competition' in the
market for the tied product."107 While the rule of reason analysis
would relax TSUM's burden of proof, it would also permit greater
considerations of consumer benefits flowing from Sony's conduct. 08
Thus, the technological and safety advantages offered by Sony's
batteries could significantly undermine TSUM's tie-in claims when
analyzed under the rule of reason.
If TSUM could not prevail under section 1 of the Sherman Act,
Sony's tying-like conduct may nevertheless violate section 2 of the
Sherman Act if there is proof of actual or probable monopolization
of the tied or tying product market. 09 For example, TSUM could try
to show that Sony used its digital key to attempt to monopolize the
battery market. In short, whether TSUM would prevail under the
U.S. approach depends on whether it could demonstrate that the
bundling of Sony digital video cameras and Sony batteries has
harmed competition.
2. The EU Approach
Under Article 82 of the EC Treaty, tie-in abuse is defined as
"making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the
other parties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or
according to commercial usage, have no connection with the nature
of such contracts.""10 In determining whether two products are
separate, the Commission would look at the buyers' demand and
ask "whether, from their perspective, in the absence of a tie-in, they
would purchase the two products on different markets.""'
If the Commission could meet its burden of proving the
circumstances violating Article 82, Sony would then bear the burden
of raising and proving objective justifications for its conduct.112
Sony's safety defense, however, may not be accepted as an objective
107. See Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 29 (1984).
108. See Microsoft III, 253 F.3d at 94-95.
109. A.B.A. Section of Antitrust Law, Antitrust Law Developments 251-52 (6th
ed. 2007).
110. EC Treaty, supra note 23, art. 82.
111. Whish, supra note 75, at 608 (citing the Commission's Guidelines on Vertical
Restraints OJ [2000] C 291/1).
112. See Case T-201/04, Microsoft Corp., 2007 E.C.R. 1144.
2009]
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
justification under certain circumstances. For example, in Hilti AG
v. Commission, the Commission rejected maintaining safety
standards as an objective justification for Hilti's requirement that
users of its patented nail cartridges also acquire its nails.113 The CFI
later upheld the Commission's decision, stating that where there
were laws about product safety and authorities enforcing those
laws, it was "clearly not the task of an undertaking in a dominant
position to take steps on its own initiative to eliminate products
which, rightly or wrongly, it regarded as dangerous or inferior to its
own products."11 4 Thus, the existence of consumer protection laws
and agencies could undermine Sony's safety justification under the
EU approach.
In another instance, the Commission rejected the dominant
undertaking's safety justification when less exclusionary means of
improving safety are available.115 Thus, for Sony's safety defense to
be recognized as an objective justification, Sony may need to show
that non-Sony batteries are unsafe and that less exclusionary means
of guaranteeing safety do not exist.1 16
In conclusion, whether Sony's conduct would be considered
abuse under the AML largely depends on which party bears the
burden of proof, and this in turn depends on whether China is likely
to follow the U.S. or the EU approach. It appears that major
components of the AML are modeled after EU antitrust laws.117 As
such, the EU approach may have a larger influence on how China
interprets the AML's provisions on the abuse of dominant
position.118 Consequently, the heavier burden would lie with Sony.
113. Case T-30/89, Hilti AG v. Conun'n, 1990 E.C.R. 11-163, upheld on appeal
Case 53/92, Hilti AG v. Comm'n, 1994 E.C.R. 1-667.
114. Case T-30/89 Hilti AG v. Comm'n, 1991 E.C.R. 11-1439 T 118.
115. Commission Decision of 24 July 1991 Relating to a Proceeding Pursuant to
Article 86 of the EEC Treaty (IV 31.043 - Tetra Pak II), 1992 O.J. (L 72) 1 119 (EC)
[hereinafter Tetra Pak II] (Tetra Pak raised safety concerns as justification for tying
the sales of its aseptic packaging machines and its cartons. The Commission found
that it could have addressed the safety problem using more proportionate means,
such as publishing clear standards and specifications to be complied with by
competitors and buyers.).
116. Sohn, supra note 86, at 577.
117. Compare AML, arts. 13-16 with EC Treaty, art. 81; and AML, arts. 17-19 with
E.C. Treaty, art. 82.
118. Sohn, supra note 86, at 576; see also Joel R. Samuels, "Tain't What You Do":
Effect of China's Proposed Anti-Monopoly Law on State Owned Enterprises, 26 PENN ST.
INT'L L. REV. 169, 183 (2007).
[Vol. 32:2
China's Anti-Monopoly Law
C. Analyzing Sony's IP Defense
Article 55 of the AML allows valid exercise of IP rights to be
exempt from the application of the AML, but what China considers
as legitimate use of IP rights remains to be seen." 9 For example,
TSUM could claim that the InfoLithium technology has little to do
with improving safety, and that Sony misused its patent protection
by erecting this technological barrier to eliminate competition. Sony
could rebut that its digital video cameras operate best with Sony's
InfoLithium batteries, which were designed in good faith to offer
technological advantages as well as minimizing unsafe
consequences.
The U.S. Supreme Court might accept Sony's argument if
competitors could not manufacture batteries with reasonably
comparable specifications for use with Sony's cameras. 20 An EU
court, on the other hand, could find that Sony should license its
technology because it would be a less exclusionary means of
responding to safety concerns. 121 Under certain circumstances, the
EU court would go as far as finding it an abuse of dominant position
if Sony refused to license its IP.122 By contrast, U.S. courts would not
compel Sony to license its IP to competitors.123 If China adopts the
EU approach, undertakings with valuable intellectual property may
be concerned that the AML would be used to undermine their IP
119. Sohn, supra note 86, at 577.
120. See Int'l Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 397-98 (1947) (Appellant salt
company leased machines that produced salt products on the condition that the
lessee purchase from appellant all salt consumed in the machines. The Court
stated: "[A] lessor may impose on a lessee reasonable restrictions designed in good
faith to minimize maintenance burdens and to assure satisfactory operation. We
may assume, as matter of argument, that if the 'Lixator' functions best on rock salt
of average sodium chloride content of 98.2%, the lessee might be required to use
only salt meeting such a specification of quality.").
121. See Case T-201/04, Microsoft Corp., 2007 E.C.R. 1144; Tetra Pak II, 1992 O.J.
(L 72) 1.
122. See, e.g., Case T-201/04, Microsoft Corp., 2007 E.C.R. 331-32 (Refusal to
license IP rights to third parties may be an abuse of dominant position when "the
refusal relates to a product or service indispensable to the exercise of a particular
activity on a neighboring market," "the refusal is of such a kind as to exclude any
effective competition on that neighboring market," and "the refusal prevents the
appearance of a new product for which there is potential consumer demand.").
123. See Verizon Commc'ns v. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398 (2004) (generally, a trader or
manufacturer is free to choose with whom he will deal); see also A.B.A. Section of
Antitrust Law, Antitrust Law Developments 1116 (6th ed. 2007). ("[C]ourts have
rejected claims that a simple unilateral refusal to license IP rights ... constitutes a
tying arrangement.").
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rights. Therefore, the validity of the Sony's IP defense would
depend, in part, on the extent to which China wishes to protect a
firm's IP rights and right to choose with whom they deal.
V. Conclusion
While China's effort to establish a set of antitrust laws is
praiseworthy, the AML leaves ample room for interpretation,
making compliance difficult. However, at least with respect to the
AML's provisions on the abuse of dominant market position, it is
likely that China will follow prevailing practices in determining
dominant position and abuse. The only significant area of
uncertainty is whether China will presume collective dominance
when an undertaking acts unilaterally.
With respect to IP, the interface between China's antitrust
policy and IP rights will depend on its attitude towards innovation
by market leaders. If China is committed to respecting IP rights, it is
not likely to systematically force dominant undertakings to license
IP to competitors. If, however, China uses the AML to find as abuse
the exercise of IP rights in normal business practices that it deems
unfavorable to its economy, it could deter investment in research
and development. This is an area where China should send a clear
signal of how the AML will be applied as uncertain restrictions may
lead to over-deterrence of innovation efforts.
Despite the uncertainties associated with the application of the
AML, U.S. and EU precendents at least offer a useful framework for
analyzing the AML as written.
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